Why Study Cost and Cost Overrun at the Olympics?
Given that the six most recent Olympic Games, held over the decade [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] , have cost on average USD 8.9 billion -not including road, rail, airport, and hotel infrastructure, which often cost more than the Games themselves -the financial size and risks of the Games warrant study. Furthermore, a focus on cost overruns as compared to the original budget is critical for future host cities to understand the implications of the investment they are undertaking. As part of bidding for hosting the Games, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) requires host cities and governments to guarantee that they will cover any cost overruns to the giant Olympics budgets. This means that the host city and nation are locked in to a non-negotiable commitment to cover any such increases. If overruns are likely this should clearly be taken into account in planning for the Games to get a realistic picture of the final outturn costs.
Moreover, given the current global economic climate and subsequent tightening of government spending in many countries, understanding the implications of major investments like the Games is critical for governments to make sound fiscal and economic decisions about their expenditures. For instance, cost overrun and associated debt from the Athens 2004 Games weakened the Greek economy and contributed to the country's deep financial and economic crises, beginning in 2007 and still playing out almost a decade later (Flyvbjerg 2011) . Similarly, in June 2016 -less than two months before the Rio 2016 opening ceremony -Rio de Janeiro's governor declared a state of emergency to secure additional funding for the Games. When Rio decided to bid for the Olympics, the Brazilian economy was doing well. Now, almost a decade later, costs were escalating and the country was in its worst economic crisis since the 1930's with negative growth and a lack of funds to cover costs. Other countries -and especially those with small and weak economies -may want to make sure they do not end up in a similar situation by having a realistic picture of costs and risks of cost overruns before they bid for the Olympic Games. The data presented in this paper will allow such assessment.
Unfortunately, Olympics officials and hosts often misinform about the costs and cost overruns of the Games. For instance, in 2005 London secured the bid for the 2012 Summer Games with a cost estimate that two years later proved inadequate and was revised upwards with around 100 percent.
Then, when it turned out that the final outturn costs were slightly below the revised budget, the organizers falsely, but very publicly, claimed that the London Games had come in under budget (BBC 2013) . Such deliberate misinformation of the public about cost and cost overrun treads a fine line between spin and outright lying. It is unethical, no doubt, but very common. We can therefore not count on organizers and governments to provide us with reliable information about the real costs and cost overruns of the Olympic Games. Independent studies are needed, like the one presented here.
Previous Studies of Cost and Cost Overrun
Interest in cost and cost overrun of the Games has been high since the establishment of the modern Olympics in 1896. As long ago as 1911 Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the man responsible for establishing the modern Games, referred to "the often exaggerated expenses incurred for the most recent Olympiads" (Coubertin, 1911) , and in 1973 Jean Drapeau, the mayor of Montreal, infamously stated "The Montreal Olympics can no more have a deficit, than a man can have a baby," which caused some peculiar cartoons in Canadian media when the Montreal Games developed a large deficit due to outsized cost overruns (CBC 2006) . Drapeau was wrong, and problems with cost and cost overrun are as prevalent today as they were in his time, and in Coubertin's before him.
Despite substantial interest in the cost of the Games, however, attempts to specifically and systematically evaluate such cost are few (Chappelet 2002 , Essex and Chalkley 2004 , Preuss 2004 , Zimbalist 2015 , Baade and Matheson 2016 , while those that do attempt them are often focused on a specific Games (Bondonio and Campaniello 2006, Brunet 1995) . Previous research on the cost of the Olympic Games has instead focused on whether the Games present a financially viable investment from the perspective of cost-benefit analysis. However, what to measure when determining the costs and benefits of the Games to a host country is open to debate and has varied widely between studies making it difficult to compare results across games. In particular, legacy benefits described in the bid are often intangible, and as such pose a difficulty in ex-post evaluations. The benefits of increased tourism revenue, jobs created by Olympic needs, or national pride are hugely varied and similarly difficult to quantify and compare. Costs are also hard to determine; for example, one could argue that if hotels in the host city have invested in renovations, and benefits of increased tourist revenues to those hotels are included in the analysis, then these costs should also be included in any accounting.
Finally, the percentage of work that an employee in an outlying city spends on Games-related work would be exceptionally difficult to estimate. Preuss (2004) contains the perhaps most comprehensive multi-Games economic analysis to date, looking at the final costs and revenues of the Summer Olympics from 1972 to 2008. Preuss finds that since 1972 every Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG), which leads the planning of the Games in the host city, has produced a positive benefit as compared to cost, but only when investments are removed from OCOG budgets. This restricts the analysis narrowly to only OCOG activities, which typically represent a fairly small portion of the overall Olympic cost and therefore also denote too limited a view for true cost-benefit analysis. Further, other authors disagree with Preuss' findings, and have suggested that the net economic benefits of the Games are negligible at best, and are rarely offset by either revenue or increases in tourism and business (Malfas, Theodoraki, and Houlihan 2004) . Furthermore, none of these studies have compared projected cost to final cost, which is a problem, because evidence from other types of megaprojects show that cost overruns may, and often do, singlehandedly cause positive projected net benefits to become negative (Flyvbjerg 2016; Ansar, Flyvbjerg, and Budzier forthcoming) . The most recent study of the economics of the Olympics, published in Journal of Economic Perspectives, found that "the overwhelming conclusion is that in most cases the Olympics are a money-losing proposition for host cities" (Baade and Matheson 2016: 202) .
In sum, we find for previous academic research on cost and cost overrun for the Olympic Games:
1. Earlier attempts to specifically and systematically evaluate cost and cost overrun in the Games are few; 2. Such attempts that exist are often focused on a specific Games or are small-sample research; 3. Earlier research on the cost of the Games has focused on cost-benefit analysis, with debatable delimitations of costs and benefits making it difficult to compare results across studies and Games. Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) documented for the first time in a consistent and comparative fashion cost and cost overrun for a large number of Olympic Games. This study took its inspiration in comparative research more broadly looking at megaprojects and used a method for measuring cost and cost overrun that is the international standard in this research field. Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002) , for example, provide an examination of rail, fixed-link (bridge and tunnel), and road projects, which finds that cost overruns are both prevalent and predictable, with average overruns of 45, 34, and 20 percent in real terms for each type of project, respectively. Their work has led to the development of a technique called "reference class forecasting" (Flyvbjerg 2008) . Based on findings from behavioral economics, reference class forecasting develops budgets through a comparison with similar completed projects, rather than the bottom-up planning approach for each individual project that is commonly used. The reference class forecasting approach has been endorsed by the American Planning Association, and has been used in the UK, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, Denmark, and Switzerland, among others, to predict megaproject costs and benefits. Budzier and Flyvbjerg (2011) have confirmed similar results for major IT programs, as have Ansar et al. (2014) for large dams.
Daniel Kahneman (2011: 251) , Nobel Prize winner in economics, has called the use of reference class forecasting "the single most important piece of advice regarding how to increase accuracy in forecasting." Drawing on these insights, the present research expands and updates Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) in an attempt to further develop our understanding of cost and cost overrun in the Olympic Games.
Measuring Cost and Cost Overrun for the Olympics
In the competition for hosting the Olympic Games cities pitch to the IOC and against each other their ideas for how to host the world's biggest sporting event and how to generate significant urban development in the process (Andranovich, Burbank, and Heying 2001) . To demonstrate their ability to achieve these goals, bidding cities are required by the IOC to develop detailed plans in the form of so-called Candidature Files that are submitted to the Committee as part of the competition to host. The Candidature Files, or "bid books" as they are more commonly known, form part of the basis of the IOC's decision for the next host city.
One of the requirements for the bid book is that it includes a budget that details the expected investment by the host country's and city's governments in the Games, in addition to a budget for expected revenues (IOC 2004) . In their bid book, governments of candidate cities and countries are also required by the IOC to provide guarantees to "ensure the financing of all major capital infrastructure investments required to deliver the Olympic Games" and "cover a potential economic shortfall of the OCOG" (ibid: p 93).
The Candidature File is a legally binding agreement, which states to citizens, decision makers, and the IOC how much it will cost to host the Games. As such the Candidature File represents the baseline from which future cost and cost overrun should be measured. If cost overrun later turns out to be zero, then decision makers made a well-informed decision in the sense that what they were told the Games would cost is what they actually cost, so they had the correct information to make their decision. If cost overrun is significantly higher than zero, then the decision was misinformed in the sense that it was based on an unrealistically low estimate of cost. However, such measurement of cost against a consistent and relevant baseline is rarely done. New budgets are typically developed after the Games were awarded, which are often substantially different to those presented at the bidding stage (Jennings 2012 ). These new budgets are used as new baselines, rendering measurement of cost overrun inconsistent and misleading both within and between Games. Using later baselines typically makes cost overruns look smaller and this is a strong incentive for using them, as in the case for London 2012 mentioned above. New budgets continue to evolve and develop over the course of the seven years of planning for the Games, until the final actual cost is perhaps presented, often several years after the Games' completion, if at all, as we will see.
In our effort to measure cost and cost overrun for the Games in a consistent and relevant manner, we searched for valid and reliable bid book and outturn cost data for both Summer and Winter Games, Costs for hosting the Games fall into the following three categories, established by the IOC:
1. Operational costs incurred by the Organising Committee for the purpose of "staging" the Games. The largest components of this budget are technology, transportation, workforce, and administration costs, while other costs include items like security, catering, ceremonies, and medical services. These may be considered the variable costs of staging the Games and are formally called "OCOG costs" by the IOC.
2. Direct capital costs incurred by the host city or country or private investors to build the competition venues, Olympic village(s), international broadcast center, and media and press center, which are required to host the Games. These are the direct capital costs of hosting the Games and are formally called "non-OCOG direct costs." 3. Indirect capital costs such as for road, rail, or airport infrastructure, or for hotel upgrades or other business investment incurred in preparation for the Games but not directly related to staging the Games. These are wider capital costs and are formally called "non-
OCOG indirect costs."
The first two items constitute the sports-related costs of the Games and are covered in the present analysis. Non-OCOG indirect costs have been omitted, because (1) data on such costs are rare, (2) where data are available, their validity and reliability typically do not live up to the standards of academic research, and (3) even where valid and reliable data exist, they are typically less comparable across cities and nations than sports-related costs, because there is a much larger element of arbitrariness in what is included in indirect costs than in what is included in sports-related costs. It should be remembered, however, that the indirect costs are often higher than the direct costs. Baade and Matheson (2016: 205) found that for seven Games for which they could obtain data for both sports infrastructure and general infrastructure, in all cases was the cost of general infrastructure higher than the cost of sports infrastructure, sometimes several times higher.
Thus, our analysis compares each of OCOG costs and non-OCOG direct costs at two distinct points in time, bid budget and final outturn cost, for all Games since 1960 for which each of these four data points exist. This is 19 Games out of a total of 30 held between 1960 and 2016. For the remaining 11
Games, valid and reliable data have not been reported that would make it possible to establish cost overrun for these Games. This is an interesting research result in its own right, because it meansincredible as it may sound -that for more than a third of the Games between 1960 and 2016 no one seems to know what the cost overrun was. Such ignorance -willful or not -hampers learning regarding how to develop more reliable budgets for the Games. From a rational point of view, learning would appear to be a self-evident objective for billion-dollar events like the Games, but often that is not the case. For some Games, hiding costs and cost overruns seems to have been more important, for whatever reason.
Nevertheless, 19 out of 30 Games is 63 percent of all possible Games for the period under consideration , which we deem sufficient for producing interesting and relevant results. -We measured costs in both nominal and real (constant, not including inflation) terms, and in both local currencies and US dollars. We followed international convention and made all comparisons across time and geographies in real terms, to ensure that like is compared with like. Further detail on methodology and how costs were converted from nominal to real terms is available in the Appendix below. The difference between cost for the Summer and Winter Games is statistically significant (W = 38, p = 0.02982). 3 Costs for the Summer Games are significantly higher (median = USD 4.8 billion) than costs for the Winter Games (median = USD 2.0 billion). Costs for the two types of Games must therefore be considered separately in statistical terms.
Costs of the Olympic Games 1960-2016
1 The Paralympic Games are not included here because they have only become fully integrated with the Olympic Games relatively recently and therefore do not compare across the period we study here.
2 The latest available forecast of the Rio 2016 cost was made public on January 29, 2016. We have reviewed the figures and sources and deemed them reliable. The forecast comprises the operational cost managed by the Rio 2016 Organising Committee (BRL 7.4 billion) and the direct capital cost managed by the Autoridade Pública Olímpica (BRL 7.1 billion). As described above, the indirect capital cost, which are also managed by the Autoridade Pública Olímpica (BRL 24.6 billion), have been omitted from the comparisons in this paper for all Games.
3 Significance is here defined in the conventional manner, with p≤0.05 being significant, p≤0.01 very significant, and p≤0.001 overwhelmingly significant. These analyses include the Rio 2016 forecasted cost. Games. This is extraordinary, given the fact that cost for the Winter Games is typically much lower than for the Summer Games, with the median cost for Winter Games being less than half the median cost for Summer Games. Figure 2 shows the correlation of cost per athlete with time. We see a shift in trend from cost per athlete being generally higher for the Summer than for the Winter Games until the mid 1980's, after which the Winter Games become more costly than the Summer Games, in terms of cost per athlete.
We also see that cost per athlete was generally decreasing for the Summer Games from the mid-1980's until the early noughties, after which cost per athlete has been increasing for both the Summer and Winter Games, driven mainly by London 2012 and Sochi 2014. Overall, however, the changes over time are statistically non-significant for both Summer Games (p = 0.4762), Winter Games (p = 0.1523), and all Games (p = 0.5399).
Figure 2: Time series of cost per athlete for Olympics 1960-2016, with and without outlier
Cost Overrun at the Games We further see that:
 15 of 19 Games (79 percent) have cost overruns above 50 percent.
 9 of 19 Games (47 percent) have cost overruns above 100 percent.
Judging from these statistics it is clear that large risks of large cost overruns are inherent to the Olympic Games.
For the Summer Games, the largest cost overrun was found for Montreal 1976 at 720 percent, followed by Barcelona 1992 at 266 percent. The smallest cost overrun for the Summer Games was found for Beijing 2008 at two percent, followed by Athens 2004 at 49 percent. For the Winter Games, the largest cost overruns are Lake Placid 1980 at 324 percent followed by Sochi 2014 at 289 percent.
The smallest cost overrun for the Winter Games was found for Vancouver 2010 at 13 percent, followed by Salt Lake City 2002 at 24 percent.
The vigilant reader may be skeptical that the lowest cost overrun of all Games was found for Beijing 2008 at two percent. China is known for its lack of reliability in economic reporting (Koch-Weser 2013). However, the total cost of USD 6.8 billion and the cost per athlete of USD 622,000 for the Beijing 2008 Games are both higher than for the majority of other Summer Games (see Tables 1 and   2 ). The reported costs are therefore deemed adequate for hosting the Beijing Games and we have seen no direct evidence that the official numbers have been manipulated and should be rejected for this reason. Like other observers of economic data from China we therefore include the numbers, with the caveat that they are possibly less reliable than numbers from other nations, given China's history of doctoring data. Again, this means that our averages for cost overrun in the Olympic Games are conservative.
We further observe about cost overrun in the Olympic Games, based on the data presented above:
1. All Games, without exception, have cost overrun. For no other type of megaproject is this the case. For other project types, typically 10-20 percent of projects come in on or under budget.
For the Olympics it is zero percent. It is worth considering this point carefully. A budget is typically established as the maximum -or, alternatively, the expected -value to be spent on a project. However, in the Games the budget is more like a fictitious minimum that is consistently overspent. Further, even more than in other megaprojects, each budget is established with a legal requirement for the host city and country government to guarantee that they will cover the cost overruns of the Games. Our data suggest the guarantee is akin to writing a blank check for the event, with certainty that the cost will be more than what has been quoted. In practice, the bid budget is really more of a down payment than it is a budget, with further installments to be paid later. and Budzier and Flyvbjerg (2011) 107 percent for major IT projects, all in real terms (see Table 4 ). The high cost overrun for the Games may be related to the fixed deadline for project delivery: the opening date cannot be moved. Therefore, when problems arise there can be no trade-off between schedule and cost, as is common for other megaprojects. All that managers can do at the Olympics is throw more money at problems, which is what happens. This is the blank check, again.
The Olympic Games have
3. The high average cost overrun for the Games, combined with the existence of outliers, should be cause for caution for anyone considering hosting the Games, and especially small or fragile economies with little capacity to absorb escalating costs and related debts. Even a small risk of a 50+ percent cost overrun on a multi-billion dollar project should concern government officials and taxpayers when a guarantee to cover cost overrun is imposed, If, perversely, one would want to make it as difficult as possible to deliver a megaproject to budget, then one would (1) make sure that those responsible for delivering the project had never delivered this type of project before, (2) place the project in a location that had never seen such a project, or at least not for the past few decades so that any lessons learned earlier would have been forgotten, and (3) enforce a non-transparent and corrupt bidding process that would encourage overbidding and "winner's curse" and place zero responsibility for costs with the entity that would decide who wins the bid. 5 This, unfortunately, is a fairly accurate description of the playbook for the Olympic Games, as they move from nation to nation and city to city, forcing hosts into a role of "eternal beginners." It is also a further explanation of why the Games hold the record for the highest cost overrun of any type of megaproject, as shown above. 6 During the 1990's, the IOC began to see that more effective knowledge transfer between host cities might be a way to counter the "eternal beginner" syndrome. The Committee therefore initiated what has become known as the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program, which is a knowledgetransfer program aimed at increasing efficiency in delivering the Games by having new host cities and nations learn from earlier ones. The key ingredients in the program are, first, a platform of relevant, accumulated knowledge and services that hosts can draw on and, second, a program to have people who will be responsible for future Games participate as trainees and observers at previous ones.
5 The "winner's curse" says that in auctions with incomplete information the winner will tend to overpay and will therefore be worse off than anticipated by winning the bid. On corruption in the Games, see Transparency
International (2016).
6 Recently, proposals have been made to host the Olympic Games in one or a few permanent locations, or, alternatively, that two successive Games should be given to the same host, so facilities could be used twice (Short 2015, Baade and Matheson 2016 
Rio 2016 Compared with Previous Games
The Rio 2016 Summer Games had not yet been held at the time of writing the present paper, as mentioned above. The latest projected cost, from January 2016, are therefore used for Rio, until such a time when final outturn cost will be available. Using these data, we find a preliminary cost for the Rio Games at USD 4.6 billion and a cost overrun of 51 percent in real terms. We see that for total sports-related outturn cost, the Rio 2016 Games are just below the median cost of all other Summer Games, which is USD 5.0 billion. The difference is non-significant, however (V = 37, p = 0.7646). We therefore conclude that the Rio 2016 Games are similar to other Summer Games in terms of cost.
For cost overrun, at 51 percent the Rio Games are lower than the median for other Summer Games, but again the difference is not statistically significant (V = 23, p = 0.156). Rio's overrun is identical to median overrun for Games since 1999 (see Table 5 ), but is less than the overruns for the most recent 
Appendix: Research Methodology
To investigate the question of cost and cost overrun at the Olympic Games, we conducted an extended search of all cost data available. We collected data on two cost components for the Games: the OCOG cost and non-OCOG direct costs. For these two components, costs at bid were determined mainly through primary data from the OCOG Candidature Files. Final OCOG costs were found chiefly in the Official Reports submitted to the IOC following each Games. Where primary sources were not available, secondary sources including audits and other research data were used, with primary sources taking precedence over secondary sources where available.
Using these data, we then proceeded with cost comparisons. For calculating cost overrun, we compared the actual outturn cost with the estimated cost in the bid year, both listed in local currency and calculated in real terms. To control for inflation over the period from bid to reporting of final outturn costs, we adjusted the cost data using local GDP deflator values to adjust the cost in local currency to the bid year, using a distribution of costs over the seven years of Games planning based on known expenditure profiles of OCOG costs and non-OCOG direct costs. The numbers for cost overrun arrived at in this manner are conservative, in the sense that they would be substantially larger We next conducted a number of statistical tests to understand the differences present in the data. Table 7 shows the hypotheses tested, the methods used, and the results found. 
